How Democracy Could Cause Economic Growth: The Last 200 Years

21 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2014 Last revised: 15 Nov 2014

See all articles by Konstantin Yanovskiy

Konstantin Yanovskiy

Shomron Center for Economic Policy Research

Daniel Shestakov

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Carol Leonard

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Date Written: November 6, 2014

Abstract

In this paper we explore current understandings of the influence of political rights, among historical legacies, on economic development. We construct variables for selected political regimes for 1811-2010. We find significant association between individual rights and economic growth. We argue that current understanding of political regimes supportive of growth (Acemoglu, etc), should parse the concept of property rights to include the protection of the individual in their focus on private property rights protection, alone, respected in various forms of government, are insufficient; what matters is the security of individuals from arbitrary arrest, regardless of type of regime. Discretionary rights of rulers or democratic governments to arrest citizens undermines the protection of private property rights and other attributes classically given to democratic foundations of economic growth, for example, free press, freedom of the exercise of religious belief. We suggest, as a research agenda, that the power of the politically competitive system therefore comes from weakening discretionary authority over law enforcement.

Keywords: Rule of Law, Rule of Force, Personal Rights, Private Property Protection

JEL Classification: P16, P50, N40, O40

Suggested Citation

Yanovskiy, Konstantin (Moshe) and Shestakov, Daniel and Leonard, Carol, How Democracy Could Cause Economic Growth: The Last 200 Years (November 6, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2519823 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2519823

Konstantin (Moshe) Yanovskiy (Contact Author)

Shomron Center for Economic Policy Research ( email )

Kley Shir 8
Karney Shomron, 44855

Daniel Shestakov

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Carol Leonard

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

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