The Balance between Competition Law and Regulation in Dutch Healthcare Markets

13 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2014 Last revised: 4 Dec 2014

See all articles by Wolf Sauter

Wolf Sauter

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam - Faculty of Law; Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM)

Date Written: November 1, 2014

Abstract

The provision of healthcare in the Netherlands is privatized, as is insurance of curative care. Hence competition law might be expected to play a significant role. However, as is demonstrated in this paper that is not the case. There are four main forms of public intervention in Dutch healthcare markets: (i) general competition law and (ii) sector-specific competition law, as well as (iii) sectoral regulation and (iv) public/private agreements. It turns out that these two forms of regulation are so far much more decisive than the two abovementioned forms of competition law. It is generally agreed that for competition to work in a liberalisation context a degree of regulation (or re-regulation) is needed. However in order for competition to work as a disciplining force on market parties and ultimately to help control healthcare costs, the present degree of regulatory intervention will have to be scaled back.

Keywords: healthcare, competition, regulation, liberalisation

JEL Classification: I01, K21, K23

Suggested Citation

Sauter, Wolf and Sauter, Wolf, The Balance between Competition Law and Regulation in Dutch Healthcare Markets (November 1, 2014). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2014-041, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2530356 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2530356

Wolf Sauter (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam - Faculty of Law ( email )

Netherlands

Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) ( email )

PO Box 16326
2500 BH The Hague
Netherlands

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