When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels?

44 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2014

See all articles by Joseph E. Harrington Jr

Joseph E. Harrington Jr

University of Pennsylvania

Myong-Hun Chang

Cleveland State University - Economics

Date Written: August 11, 2014

Abstract

Leniency programs have become widespread and are generally quite active as reflected in the number of applications. What is not well-understood is how they affect the number of cartels. This paper develops and explores a theoretical framework to help understand when leniency programs are likely to be effective in reducing the presence of cartels. Plausible conditions are derived whereby a leniency program can result in more cartels. On a more positive note, we identify situations and policies that a competition authority can pursue that will make it more likely that a leniency program will have the intended effect of reducing the number of cartels.

Suggested Citation

Harrington Jr, Joseph E. and Chang, Myong-Hun, When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels? (August 11, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2530545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2530545

Joseph E. Harrington Jr (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19102
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Myong-Hun Chang

Cleveland State University - Economics ( email )

Cleveland, OH
United States

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