Enterprise-Level Bargaining and Labour Productivity of Italian Family Firms: A Quantile Regression Analysis

39 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2014

See all articles by Mirella Damiani

Mirella Damiani

University of Perugia - University of Perugia

Fabrizio Pompei

University of Perugia - Department of Economics

Andrea Ricci

ISFOL, Rome (Italy)

Date Written: December 4, 2014

Abstract

We investigate the role of Italian firms to evaluate their role on labour productivity performance. We find that family owned firms are less efficient than their no-family counterparts and also that family management negatively affects labour productivity. Furthermore, we estimate the role of firm level bargaining to verify whether family controlled firms, adopting these types of agreements, may partially close their efficiency gap with respect to their competitors. We find that enterprises under family governance obtain significant efficiency gains when they adopt firm level bargaining, greater than those obtained by their no-family counterparts.

Keywords: Family firms, corporate governance, labour productivity

JEL Classification: G32, G34, D24

Suggested Citation

Damiani, Mirella and Pompei, Fabrizio and Ricci, Andrea, Enterprise-Level Bargaining and Labour Productivity of Italian Family Firms: A Quantile Regression Analysis (December 4, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2533845 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2533845

Mirella Damiani

University of Perugia - University of Perugia ( email )

Via A. Pascoli
Perugia, Perugia 06123
Italy

Fabrizio Pompei (Contact Author)

University of Perugia - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Pascoli, 20
Perugia, 06123
Italy

Andrea Ricci

ISFOL, Rome (Italy) ( email )

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
52
Abstract Views
511
Rank
684,709
PlumX Metrics