Escaping the Great Recession

51 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2014

See all articles by Francesco Bianchi

Francesco Bianchi

Johns Hopkins University; NBER; CEPR

Leonardo Melosi

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Multiple version iconThere are 5 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 1, 2014

Abstract

While high uncertainty is an inherent implication of the economy entering the zero lower bound, deflation is not, because agents are likely to be uncertain about the way policymakers will deal with the large stock of debt arising from a severe recession. We draw this conclusion based on a new-Keynesian model in which the monetary/fiscal policy mix can change over time and zero-lower-bound episodes are recurrent. Given that policymakers’ behavior is constrained at the zero lower bound, beliefs about the exit strategy play a key role. Announcing a period of austerity is detrimental in the short run, but it preserves macroeconomic stability in the long run. A large recession can be avoided by abandoning fiscal discipline, but this results in a sharp increase in macroeconomic instability once the economy is out of the recession. Contradictory announcements by the fiscal and monetary authorities can lead to high inflation and large output losses. The policy trade-off can be resolved by committing to inflate away only the portion of debt resulting from an unusually large recession.

Keywords: Public Debt, Inflation, Zero Lower Bound, Uncertainty, Macroeconomic Instability, Policy Announcements

JEL Classification: E31, E52, E62, E63, D83

Suggested Citation

Bianchi, Francesco and Melosi, Leonardo, Escaping the Great Recession (January 1, 2014). FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. 2014-17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2537491 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2537491

Francesco Bianchi

Johns Hopkins University ( email )

Baltimore, MD 20036-1984
United States
14127156283 (Phone)

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Leonardo Melosi (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ( email )

230 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
United States

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