Two-Person Repeated Games with Finite Automata

Posted: 14 Feb 2001

See all articles by Abraham Neyman

Abraham Neyman

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Daijiro Okada

SUNY at Stony Brook University, College of Arts and Science, Department of Economics

Abstract

We study two-person repeated games in which a player with a restricted set of strategies plays against an unrestricted player. An exogenously given bound on the complexity of strategies, which is measured by the size of the smallest automata that implement them, gives rise to a restriction on strategies available to a player.

We examine the asymptotic behavior of the set of equilibrium payoffs as the bound on the strategic complexity of the restricted player tends to infinity, but sufficiently slowly. Results from the study of zero sum case provide the individually rational payoff levels.

Key words: repeated games, finite automata

JEL Classification: C73, C72

Suggested Citation

Neyman, Abraham and Okada, Daijiro, Two-Person Repeated Games with Finite Automata. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=254093

Abraham Neyman (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem ( email )

Feldman Building
Givat-Ram
Jerusalem, 91904
Israel
972-2-6586251 (Phone)
972-2-6513681 (Fax)

Daijiro Okada

SUNY at Stony Brook University, College of Arts and Science, Department of Economics ( email )

Stony Brook, NY 11794
United States

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