Competition and Bank Opacity

54 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2014 Last revised: 24 Mar 2023

See all articles by Liangliang Jiang

Liangliang Jiang

Hong Kong Polytechnic University

Ross Levine

Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Chen Lin

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2014

Abstract

Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public and regulators? We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results indicate that competition reduces bank opacity, enhancing the ability of markets and regulators to monitor banks.

Suggested Citation

Jiang, Liangliang and Levine, Ross and Lin, Chen, Competition and Bank Opacity (December 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20760, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2541536

Liangliang Jiang (Contact Author)

Hong Kong Polytechnic University ( email )

11 Yuk Choi Rd
Hung Hom
Hong Kong

Ross Levine

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Chen Lin

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
China

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
50
Abstract Views
975
PlumX Metrics