Binding Promises and Cooperation Among Strangers
10 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2014
Date Written: November 27, 2012
Abstract
In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.
Keywords: coordination, cheap-talk, deception, repeated game, social norms
JEL Classification: C90, C70, D80
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Camera, Gabriele and Casari, Marco and Bigoni, Maria, Binding Promises and Cooperation Among Strangers (November 27, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2541948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2541948
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