Sado-Masochism in Buchanan's Samaritan's Dilemma. A Constitutional Perspective

13 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2014 Last revised: 10 May 2022

See all articles by Alain Marciano

Alain Marciano

Universita degli Studi di Torino; Karl Mittermaier Centre for Philosophy of Economics, University of Johannesburg; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Date Written: December 16, 2019

Abstract

In this paper, we study the impact of altruism on an interaction between a samaritan and a recipient/parasite in the frame of Buchanan's samaritan's dilemma (1975). We show that, as soon as altruism reaches a certain threshold, the equilibrium of the game corresponds to the situation Buchanan called a samaritan's dilemma. We also show that the Nash equilibrium reached for these levels of altruism is a Pareto-efficient outcome. Thus, the situation Buchanan characterized as a samaritan's dilemma is not a dilemma at all. Both players are satisfied with the situation as it is and need each other, up to the point of giving birth to a sado-masochistic equilibrium. We also show that this result holds if and only if the constitutional rules are given—either the ethical rules followed by the individuals, or the form of the game. This equilibrium could be avoided if the players adopted a constitutional perspective on the situation.

Keywords: Altruism, Samaritan's dilemma, Sadism, Masochism, Cooperation

JEL Classification: C72, D91

Suggested Citation

Marciano, Alain, Sado-Masochism in Buchanan's Samaritan's Dilemma. A Constitutional Perspective (December 16, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2543073 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2543073

Alain Marciano (Contact Author)

Universita degli Studi di Torino ( email )

Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica
Lungo Dora Siena, 100
Torino, 10153
Italy

Karl Mittermaier Centre for Philosophy of Economics, University of Johannesburg ( email )

Johannesburg
South Africa

George Mason University - Mercatus Center

VA
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
103
Abstract Views
1,081
Rank
469,855
PlumX Metrics