Transparency and Liability in Leniency Programmes: A Question of Balancing?
Draft Chapter for ‘EU Competition Law and the Emerging Harmonization of Private Enforcement’ (Hart Publishing, Forthcoming)
Lund University Legal Research Paper Series Paper No 01/2015
18 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2015
Date Written: January 4, 2015
Abstract
The leniency programme is a programme developed by the Commission, through its Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases. Though leniency programmes have no legislative force and are not binding on Member States, they serve the objective of effective application of Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU and thus can be viewed as useful tools to uncover and bring to end infringements of competition rules. In that sense, they form part of the public enforcement of competition law. Another tool for ensuring the effective application of competition rules is through the use of private liability claims, the so-called private enforcement of competition law. The aim of this Chapter is to clarify the relationship between private enforcement actions and the leniency programme, viewed through the rules on the protection or disclosure of information from one process to the other. Asking whether the lack of transparency in the disclosure rules and the manner in which information access is granted to by private litigants contained in EU leniency applications has the potential to undermine the leniency program.
Keywords: EU competition law, leniency, private damages, EU law, balancing
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