Transparency and Liability in Leniency Programmes: A Question of Balancing?

Draft Chapter for ‘EU Competition Law and the Emerging Harmonization of Private Enforcement’ (Hart Publishing, Forthcoming)

Lund University Legal Research Paper Series Paper No 01/2015

18 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2015

See all articles by Xavier Groussot

Xavier Groussot

Lund University; Lund University

Justin Pierce

Lund University - Faculty of Law

Date Written: January 4, 2015

Abstract

The leniency programme is a programme developed by the Commission, through its Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases. Though leniency programmes have no legislative force and are not binding on Member States, they serve the objective of effective application of Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU and thus can be viewed as useful tools to uncover and bring to end infringements of competition rules. In that sense, they form part of the public enforcement of competition law. Another tool for ensuring the effective application of competition rules is through the use of private liability claims, the so-called private enforcement of competition law. The aim of this Chapter is to clarify the relationship between private enforcement actions and the leniency programme, viewed through the rules on the protection or disclosure of information from one process to the other. Asking whether the lack of transparency in the disclosure rules and the manner in which information access is granted to by private litigants contained in EU leniency applications has the potential to undermine the leniency program.

Keywords: EU competition law, leniency, private damages, EU law, balancing

Suggested Citation

Groussot, Xavier and Pierce, Justin, Transparency and Liability in Leniency Programmes: A Question of Balancing? (January 4, 2015). Draft Chapter for ‘EU Competition Law and the Emerging Harmonization of Private Enforcement’ (Hart Publishing, Forthcoming), Lund University Legal Research Paper Series Paper No 01/2015 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2545011

Xavier Groussot

Lund University ( email )

Lilla Gråbrödersgatan 4
Lund, 222 22
Sweden

Lund University ( email )

Box 117
Lund, SC Skane S221 00
Sweden

Justin Pierce (Contact Author)

Lund University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Lilla Gråbrödersgatan 4
Lund, 222 22
Sweden

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