'State Compulsion Defense' under the Egyptian Competition Law

E.C.L.R., Issue 11, Vol. 35, 2014.

6 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2015

See all articles by Mohamed ElFar

Mohamed ElFar

Queen Mary - University of London

Date Written: November 1, 2014

Abstract

State compulsion was developed by the Egyptian Competition Authority’s (the "ECA") practice under the Egyptian Competition Law ("ECL"), stemming from the fact that contracts or agreements presuppose that their parties concluded them willfully.

However, considering the ECA's decisions, it will be revealed that there are two main enforcement policies. The first is where the ECA interprets state compulsion broadly and hence, it refrains from inspecting any market where there is any sort of governmental presence.

The second is where the ECA applies the state compulsion defense narrowly bringing its enforcement policy in line with that of the EU where it decided in a number of cases that monitoring, sponsoring, approving anticompetitive conduct are not seen as valid defenses by infringers to escape the enforcement of the ECL.

It is argued that this narrow interpretation of state compulsion defense seems to be going to become the prevalent enforcement policy. This is because it is supported by a decision by the Court of Appeal ensuring that the ECA has the jurisdiction to intervene in any market enabling it to apply the ECL without being obstructed by governmental actions.

Keywords: competition, state compulsion, regulated conduct, Egyptian Competition Authority, Egyptian competition law, competition law, Egypt, cement, electricity, fertilizers, mobile operators, telecommunications, cartel, antitrust, enforcement, abuse of dominance, enforcement policy

JEL Classification: K21, D4, L4

Suggested Citation

ElFar, Mohamed, 'State Compulsion Defense' under the Egyptian Competition Law (November 1, 2014). E.C.L.R., Issue 11, Vol. 35, 2014., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2545063

Mohamed ElFar (Contact Author)

Queen Mary - University of London ( email )

Mile End Road
Mile End
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom

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