"The Federal Deposit Insurance Fund that Didn't Put a Bite on U.S. Tax Payers"

23 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2000 Last revised: 15 Sep 2022

See all articles by Edward J. Kane

Edward J. Kane

Boston College - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert J. Hendershott

Santa Clara University

Date Written: February 1994

Abstract

Unlike the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and the Bank Insurance Fund, the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) entered the 1990s in a state of accounting solvency. This paper develops evidence to show the more important fact that NCUSIF remained solvent in a market-value sense as well. Differences in institutional product lines and risk-taking opportunities between credit unions and banks and thrifts are not consequential enough to explain the differences in their funds' health. This paper explains how differences in decisionmaking environments made managerial and regulatory risk-taking incentives in the credit-union industry diverge substantially from those governing banks and S&Ls. The differences in incentive structure support the hypothesis that private coinsurance could lessen taxpayer loss exposure elsewhere in the federal deposit insurance system.

Suggested Citation

Kane, Edward J. and Hendershott, Robert J., "The Federal Deposit Insurance Fund that Didn't Put a Bite on U.S. Tax Payers" (February 1994). NBER Working Paper No. w4648, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=254534

Edward J. Kane (Contact Author)

Boston College - Department of Finance ( email )

Fulton Hall
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Robert J. Hendershott

Santa Clara University ( email )

Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States
408-554-4698 (Phone)
408-554-4029 (Fax)

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