Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries

30 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2001

See all articles by Gary E. Bolton

Gary E. Bolton

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Supply Chain & Information Systems

Jordi Brandts

Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC) Barcelona

Axel Ockenfels

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 2000

Abstract

Procedures are the area where fairness arguably has its largest influence on modern societies. The experiments we report provide an initial characterization of that influence and suggest new interpretations for some well-known results. We find that procedural fairness is conceptually distinct from allocation fairness, although the evidence also indicates that the two are linked in important ways. Post hoc extension of one of the current models of fairness illustrates this link and implies that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness will require investigation of competing fairness norms.

Suggested Citation

Bolton, Gary Eugene and Brandts, Jordi and Ockenfels, Axel, Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries (October 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=254871 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.254871

Gary Eugene Bolton

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Supply Chain & Information Systems ( email )

Dept. of Supply Chain & Information Systems
University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States
814-865-0611 (Phone)
814-863-2381 (Fax)

Jordi Brandts (Contact Author)

Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC) Barcelona ( email )

UAB Campus
E-08193 Bellaterra
Spain

Axel Ockenfels

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Cologne - Department of Economics ( email )

Albertus Magnus Platz
Cologne 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/

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