Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment

46 Pages Posted: 17 Jan 2015

See all articles by Steffen Altmann

Steffen Altmann

University of Copenhagen; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Armin Falk

University of Bonn - Economic Science Area; briq - Institute on Behavior & Inequality

Paul Heidhues

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Rajshri Jayaraman

ESMT European School of Management and Technology

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2014

Abstract

We study how website defaults affect consumer behavior in the domain of charitable giving. In a field experiment that was conducted on a large platform for making charitable donations over the web, we exogenously vary the default options in two distinct choice dimensions. The first pertains to the primary donation decision, namely, how much to contribute to the charitable cause. The second relates to an "add-on" decision of how much to contribute to supporting the online platform itself. We find a strong impact of defaults on individual behavior: in each of our treatments, the modal positive contributions in both choice dimensions invariably correspond to the specified default amounts. Defaults, nevertheless, have no impact on aggregate donations. This is because defaults in the donation domain induce some people to donate more and others to donate less than they otherwise would have. In contrast, higher defaults in the secondary choice dimension unambiguously induce higher contributions to the online platform.

Keywords: Default Options, Charitable Giving, Online Platforms, Field Experiment

JEL Classification: C93, D03, D64

Suggested Citation

Altmann, Steffen and Falk, Armin and Heidhues, Paul and Jayaraman, Rajshri, Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment (November 2014). DIW Berlin Discussion Paper 1430, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2550691 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2550691

Steffen Altmann

University of Copenhagen ( email )

Nørregade 10
Copenhagen, København DK-1165
Denmark

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Armin Falk (Contact Author)

University of Bonn - Economic Science Area ( email )

briq - Institute on Behavior & Inequality

Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5-9
Bonn, 53113
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.briq-institute.org/

Paul Heidhues

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Universitaetsstr. 1
Duesseldorf, NRW 40225
Germany

Rajshri Jayaraman

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, Berlin 10178
Germany

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