Moral Self-Licensing and the Direct Touch Effect

31 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2015

See all articles by Markus Sass

Markus Sass

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg

Joachim Weimann

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg - Institute of Economics and Business Administration; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: January 30, 2015

Abstract

Repeated experiments with a time span of one week between repetitions are used in order to test two related hypotheses. The first is the moral self-licensing effect, which describes people’s tendency to allow themselves to act more selfishly on the back of previous prosocial or selfless behavior. The second is the direct touch effect, which describes the difference between experiences perceived directly by the senses and those perceived in a more hypothetical or abstract way. As games in which both effects can be detected we use the standard trust game and the mutual gift-giving game. Preferences were elicited by the strategy method and both games were played with and without feedback information between the waves. In both games, the moral self-licensing effect as well as the direct touch effect could be observed. Finally, we use a solidarity game to check whether these effects also determine behavior in situations with a different social norm. We find that this is not the case.

Keywords: trust game, moral self-licensing effect, direct touch effect

JEL Classification: C910, C730

Suggested Citation

Sass, Markus and Weimann, Joachim, Moral Self-Licensing and the Direct Touch Effect (January 30, 2015). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5174, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2559713 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2559713

Markus Sass (Contact Author)

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg ( email )

Universitätspl. 2
PSF 4120
Magdeburg, D-39016
Germany

Joachim Weimann

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg - Institute of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Universitaetsplatz 2
Magdeburg, 39016
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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