Stock Market Returns, Corporate Governance and Capital Market Equilibrium

56 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2015

See all articles by Bruno Maria Parigi

Bruno Maria Parigi

University of Padua - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Loriana Pelizzon

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Universitaet Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2015

Abstract

This paper analyzes why corporate governance matters for stock returns if the stock market prices the underlying managerial agency problem correctly. Our theory assumes that strict corporate governance prevents managers from diverting cash flows, but reduces incentives for managerial effort. In capital market equilibrium, this trade-off has implications for the firm's earnings, stock returns, and managerial ownership, because governance impacts the firm's risk-return structure. In particular, the strictness of corporate governance is negatively related to earnings and positively to ß;. Various empirical tests with U.S. data using the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) yield results consistent with these predictions.

Keywords: beta, CAPM, cash flow, Corporate governance, stock returns

JEL Classification: G32, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Parigi, Bruno Maria and Parigi, Bruno Maria and Pelizzon, Loriana and von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, Stock Market Returns, Corporate Governance and Capital Market Equilibrium (February 2015). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10392, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2562917

Bruno Maria Parigi (Contact Author)

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Loriana Pelizzon

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, D-60323
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.safe-frankfurt.de

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden

Universitaet Mannheim ( email )

Department of Economics
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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