The (Non-)Robustness of Influential Cheap Talk Equilibria When the Sender's Preferences Are State Independent
23 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2015 Last revised: 25 Mar 2021
Date Written: March 16, 2021
Abstract
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state independent. We show that influential equilibria do not survive the introduction of any small degree of Harsanyi-Uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the sender's preferences in the spirit of Harsanyi (1973).
Keywords: cheap talk, communication, information transmission, robustness
JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Diehl, Christoph and Kuzmics, Christoph, The (Non-)Robustness of Influential Cheap Talk Equilibria When the Sender's Preferences Are State Independent (March 16, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2566247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2566247
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