Gender Effects, Culture and Social Influence in the Dictator Game: An Italian Study

21 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2015

See all articles by Niall O'Higgins

Niall O'Higgins

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II; ILO; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

Arturo Palomba

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II

Patrizia Sbriglia

University of Naples Federico II

Abstract

There is little consensus on whether women are more generous than men; some research results indicate a higher propensity towards giving of female dictators, whilst others suggest the opposite. Two explanations have been put forward. According to the first one, women are more generous than men and the conflicting results are due to the way preferences are elicited (Eckel and Grossman, 2002), since women are more sensitive to "social cues" and their preferences are more "malleable" (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). According to the second one, the institutional culture and the role women have in society are key elements in shaping gender differences in preferences. In fact, in matrilineal societies (Gong et al.; 2014; Gneezy et al.; 2009), women are self-oriented, more competitive and less generous than men, since they have an important role as economic decision makers in the family and the society. We test these alternative hypotheses running Dictators experiments in Italy, a western country with a matrilineal culture, introducing – at the same time - social influence in the design. We find more support to the hypothesis on the cultural role in shaping preferences, rather than the effects of social influence.

Keywords: social influence, gender, social preferences, experiments, dictator game

JEL Classification: C90, C91, D03, J16

Suggested Citation

O'Higgins, Shane Niall and O'Higgins, Shane Niall and Palomba, Arturo and Sbriglia, Patrizia, Gender Effects, Culture and Social Influence in the Dictator Game: An Italian Study. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8860, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2575040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2575040

Shane Niall O'Higgins (Contact Author)

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II ( email )

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Italy

ILO ( email )

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Switzerland

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

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Arturo Palomba

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II

via Cinthia, 4
Naples, Caserta 80126
Italy

Patrizia Sbriglia

University of Naples Federico II ( email )

Via Catullo 64
80122 Napoli, Caserta
Italy

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