White Hats or Don Quixotes? Human Rights Vigilantes in the Global Economy

60 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2001 Last revised: 22 Aug 2022

See all articles by Kimberly Ann Elliott

Kimberly Ann Elliott

Institute for International Economics; Center for Global Development

Richard B. Freeman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies; Harvard University; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Date Written: January 2001

Abstract

With the continuing expansion of global economic integration, labor standards in developing countries have become a hot button issue. One result has been a proliferation of efforts to use the market to put pressure directly on multinational corporations to improve wages and working conditions in their overseas operations and to insist that their suppliers do so as well. This paper analyzes the dynamics of these efforts in terms of a 'market for standards' in which consumers, stimulated by human rights activists, demand that corporations improve working conditions in supplier factories. The paper presents evidence that such a consumer demand exists and analyzes the incentives corporations face to respond to it. It examines the nature of the critical intermediary role played by activists in stimulating consumer demands and assesses the outcomes in the major anti-sweatshop campaigns of the 1990s. The paper also addresses the limitations of such consumer-based campaigns and the concern expressed by some that these activist campaigns may do more harm than good, by deterring investment in and trade with poor countries. It concludes with an overall assessment of when 'doing good' actually does good.

Suggested Citation

Elliott, Kimberly Ann and Elliott, Kimberly Ann and Freeman, Richard B., White Hats or Don Quixotes? Human Rights Vigilantes in the Global Economy (January 2001). NBER Working Paper No. w8102, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=257841

Kimberly Ann Elliott (Contact Author)

Institute for International Economics ( email )

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Richard B. Freeman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies ( email )

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