Governments' Payment Discipline: The Macroeconomic Impact of Public Payment Delays and Arrears

37 Pages Posted: 28 Mar 2015

See all articles by Cristina D. Checherita-Westphal

Cristina D. Checherita-Westphal

European Central Bank (ECB)

Alexander Klemm

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Paul Viefers

A.T. Kearney GmbH

Date Written: March 26, 2015

Abstract

This paper considers the impact of changes in governments' payment discipline on the private sector. We argue that increased delays in public payments can affect private sector liquidity and profits and hence ultimately economic growth. We test this prediction empirically for European Union countries using two complementary approaches. First, we use annual panel data, including a newly constructed proxy for government arrears. Using panel data techniques, including methods that allow for endogeneity, we find that payment delays and to some extent estimated arrears lead to a higher likelihood of bankruptcy, lower profits, and lower economic growth. While this approach allows a broad set of variables to be included, it restricts the number of time periods. We therefore complement it with a Bayesian VAR approach on quarterly data for selected countries faced with significant payment delays. With this second approach, we also find that the likelihood of bankruptcies rises when the governments increase the average payment period.

Keywords: public payment delays, government arrears, accounts payable, government spending

JEL Classification: E6, H6, H8

Suggested Citation

Checherita-Westphal, Cristina D. and Klemm, Alexander and Viefers, Paul, Governments' Payment Discipline: The Macroeconomic Impact of Public Payment Delays and Arrears (March 26, 2015). ECB Working Paper No. 1771, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2585426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2585426

Cristina D. Checherita-Westphal (Contact Author)

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Alexander Klemm

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Paul Viefers

A.T. Kearney GmbH ( email )

Dreischeibenhaus 1
Düsseldorf, Deutschland (DEU) 40211
Germany

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