Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives

35 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2001

See all articles by Jason R. Barro

Jason R. Barro

HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Nancy Dean Beaulieu

HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: July 2000

Abstract

In this study we examine the effects of transferring physicians from a compensation system based on salary to a profit-sharing system. Consistent with theory, we find that the change has a large and significant effect on the quantity of services provided. In addition, we find a selection effect, where the least productive doctors leave the company and more productive doctors join.

Keywords: Physician, Compensation, Incentives, Hospital, Selection, Motivation

JEL Classification: I1, J3, L0, L3

Suggested Citation

Barro, Jason R. and Beaulieu, Nancy D., Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives (July 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=258560 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.258560

Jason R. Barro (Contact Author)

HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Nancy D. Beaulieu

HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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