Should Courts Deduct Non-Legal Sanctions from Damages?

Posted: 15 Nov 2001 Last revised: 1 Apr 2021

See all articles by Robert D. Cooter

Robert D. Cooter

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Ariel Porat

Tel Aviv University; University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: December 3, 2000

Abstract

When legal and social norms regulate the same behavior, an act can trigger both legal and non-legal sanctions. Should courts deduct the non-legal sanction suffered by the wrongdoer from damages owed to the victim? We provide the answer for a legal system that seeks to minimize social costs. Non-legal sanctions typically harm the wrongdoer and benefit other people. In principle, courts should avoid over-deterring wrongdoers by deducting the benefit of the non-legal sanction from compensatory damages. In practice, instead of deducting the benefit of the non-legal sanction to other people, courts should deduct the burden on the wrongdoer. Deducting the burden of the non-legal sanction from compensatory damages typically improves the incentives of wrongdoers and victims. We make practical suggestions for courts to implement our proposal that would significantly reduce damages in torts and contracts.

Suggested Citation

Cooter, Robert D. and Porat, Ariel, Should Courts Deduct Non-Legal Sanctions from Damages? (December 3, 2000). 30 Journal of Legal Studies 401 (2001), UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 70, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=259849

Robert D. Cooter (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-642-0503 (Phone)
510-642-3767 (Fax)

Ariel Porat

Tel Aviv University ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
972-3-6408283 (Phone)
972-3-6407260 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://english.tau.ac.il/profile/porata

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/porat

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