Culture, Institutions and Democratization

43 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2015 Last revised: 15 Mar 2023

See all articles by Yuriy Gorodnichenko

Yuriy Gorodnichenko

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Gérard Roland

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: April 2015

Abstract

We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under individualistic and collectivist cultures. The main result is that, despite facing potentially larger collective action problems, countries with an individualistic culture are more likely to end up adopting democracy earlier than countries with a collectivist culture. Our empirical analysis suggests a strong and robust association between individualistic culture and average polity scores and length of democracy, even after controlling for other determinants of democracy emphasized in the literature. We provide evidence that countries with collectivist culture are also more likely to experience autocratic breakdowns and transitions from autocracy to autocracy.

Suggested Citation

Gorodnichenko, Yuriy and Roland, Gérard, Culture, Institutions and Democratization (April 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21117, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2599383

Yuriy Gorodnichenko (Contact Author)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

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Gérard Roland

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States
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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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United Kingdom

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