How Should India Reform Its Labour Laws?

29 Pages Posted: 2 May 2015

See all articles by Simon Deakin

Simon Deakin

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law

Antara Haldar

Columbia University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 31, 2015

Abstract

We examine the current policy debate around the reform of labour laws in India, which has been stimulated in part by the success of the Gujarat model of economic development. Gujarat’s deregulatory reforms have included changes to the legal regime governing employment terminations, which could form a basis for a change in national-level labour laws. Evidence linking labour law deregulation to growth, however, is weak, whether the focus is on India or the experience of other countries. Building labour market institutions is a long-term process which requires investment in state capacity for the management of risks associated with the transition to a formal economy.

Keywords: labour law, institutions, India, law reform, Gujarat model

JEL Classification: J53, J58, K31

Suggested Citation

Deakin, Simon F. and Haldar, Antara, How Should India Reform Its Labour Laws? (March 31, 2015). University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 25/2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2601039 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2601039

Simon F. Deakin (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR) ( email )

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Cambridge, CB2 1AG
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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

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Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
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Antara Haldar

Columbia University ( email )

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New York, NY 10027
United States

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