Is a Minimum Regulation Efficient: Empirical Evidence from Roadworthiness Inspection Regime in EU-27

21 Pages Posted: 2 May 2015

Date Written: May 1, 2015

Abstract

Is a minimum regulation efficient or not? This general question of the paper is answered by empirical evidence using cost-benefit analyses. The period technical inspection in the European Union is regulated by a minimum regulation leading to 13 different practices of roadworthiness inspection of passenger cars and light goods vehicles. It can be shown that for Belgium, which has a best-case inspection, moving to the minimum regulation will lead to annual welfare losses of $93.6 million, and for Germany a marginal improvement of the minimum regulation leads to $1 billion benefits per year and an average benefit cost-ratio of 1.7.

Keywords: minimum regulation, roadworthiness inspections, cost-benefit analysis

JEL Classification: D61, D78, L51, R41

Suggested Citation

Schulz, Wolfgang H., Is a Minimum Regulation Efficient: Empirical Evidence from Roadworthiness Inspection Regime in EU-27 (May 1, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2601329 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2601329

Wolfgang H. Schulz (Contact Author)

Zeppelin University ( email )

Am Seemooser Horn 20
Friedrichshafen, Lake Constance 88045
Germany
+491734638421 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.zu.de

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