Noncognitivism, Normativity, and Belief: A Reply to Jackson

Ratio 14(2) (2001), 185-190.

6 Pages Posted: 18 May 2015

See all articles by David Enoch

David Enoch

Hebrew University - The Philosophy Department and the Law School

Date Written: May 17, 2015

Abstract

In a recent paper in Ratio, Frank Jackson argues that widely accepted normative constraints on beliefs commit any noncognitivist about normativity to noncognitivism about belief, a position he takes to be highly implausible. I argue that Jackson’s argument fails, and that a noncognitivist can easily escape this unwanted result.

I argue that Jackson goes wrong in failing to take into account the distinction between normative and conceptual necessity, a distinction the noncognitivist is entitled to, at least in attempting to reply to what is supposed to be a reductio argument against noncognitivism. Though the noncognitivist is committed to certain normative constraints on belief, she is not committed to these constraints being conceptually necessary, a part of what a belief is. And once this is noticed, Jackson’s argument can be clearly seen to fail.

Keywords: Noncognitivism, Metaethics, Frank Jackson

Suggested Citation

Enoch, David, Noncognitivism, Normativity, and Belief: A Reply to Jackson (May 17, 2015). Ratio 14(2) (2001), 185-190., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2607301

David Enoch (Contact Author)

Hebrew University - The Philosophy Department and the Law School ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
32
Abstract Views
462
PlumX Metrics