Noncognitivism, Normativity, and Belief: A Reply to Jackson
Ratio 14(2) (2001), 185-190.
6 Pages Posted: 18 May 2015
Date Written: May 17, 2015
Abstract
In a recent paper in Ratio, Frank Jackson argues that widely accepted normative constraints on beliefs commit any noncognitivist about normativity to noncognitivism about belief, a position he takes to be highly implausible. I argue that Jackson’s argument fails, and that a noncognitivist can easily escape this unwanted result.
I argue that Jackson goes wrong in failing to take into account the distinction between normative and conceptual necessity, a distinction the noncognitivist is entitled to, at least in attempting to reply to what is supposed to be a reductio argument against noncognitivism. Though the noncognitivist is committed to certain normative constraints on belief, she is not committed to these constraints being conceptually necessary, a part of what a belief is. And once this is noticed, Jackson’s argument can be clearly seen to fail.
Keywords: Noncognitivism, Metaethics, Frank Jackson
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