Energy Subsidies and Public Social Spending: Theory and Evidence

31 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2015

See all articles by Christian Ebeke

Christian Ebeke

Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International, CERDI-CNRS

Constant Lonkeng Ngouana

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Date Written: May 2015

Abstract

This paper shows that high energy subsidies and low public social spending can emerge as an equilibrium outcome of a political game between the elite and the middle-class when the provision of public goods is subject to bottlenecks, reflecting weak domestic institutions. We test this and other predictions of our model using a large cross-section of emerging markets and low-income countries. The main empirical challenge is that subsidies and social spending could be jointly determined (e.g., at the time of the budget), leading to a simultaneity bias in OLS estimates. To address this concern, we adopt an identification strategy whereby subsidies in a given country are instrumented by the level of subsidies in neighboring countries. Our Instrumental Variable (IV) estimations suggest that public expenditures in education and health were on average lower by 0.6 percentage point of GDP in countries where energy subsidies were 1 percentage point of GDP higher. Moreover, we find that the crowding-out was stronger in the presence of weak domestic institutions, narrow fiscal space, and among the net oil importers.

Keywords: Energy sector, Subsidies, Public expenditures and education, Public expenditures and health, Public goods, Econometric models, Energy subsidies, Public social spending, Causality., subsidy, tax, energy subsidy, consumption, income, economy

JEL Classification: C21, C26, D71, H23, H41

Suggested Citation

Ebeke, Christian and Lonkeng Ngouana, Constant, Energy Subsidies and Public Social Spending: Theory and Evidence (May 2015). IMF Working Paper No. 15/101, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2613300

Christian Ebeke (Contact Author)

Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International, CERDI-CNRS ( email )

65 Boulevard Francois Mitterrand
63000 Clermont-Ferrand Cedex 1
France

Constant Lonkeng Ngouana

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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