Interest Groups, Democracy, and Policy Volatility

Contemporary Economic Policy. April 2016, 34(2): 223-233.

25 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2015 Last revised: 28 Jul 2023

See all articles by Jac C. Heckelman

Jac C. Heckelman

Wake Forest University - Department of Economics

Bonnie Wilson

Saint Louis University - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 1, 2015

Abstract

Democratic polities appear to produce more stable policy than do autocracies. In this paper, we explore a potential source of the policy stability observed in democracies: special-interest groups. We find that interest groups are associated with greater stability in some measures of policy and that groups mediate the stabilizing impact of democracy on policy. We also find that the impact of interest groups on policy volatility depends on the degree of polarization in a society.

Keywords: special-interest groups; policy volatility; democracy

Suggested Citation

Heckelman, Jac C. and Wilson, Bonnie, Interest Groups, Democracy, and Policy Volatility (June 1, 2015). Contemporary Economic Policy. April 2016, 34(2): 223-233., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2613503 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2613503

Jac C. Heckelman

Wake Forest University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7505
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
United States
(336) 758-5923 (Phone)
(336) 758-6028 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wfu.edu/~heckeljc/jac.htm

Bonnie Wilson (Contact Author)

Saint Louis University - Department of Economics ( email )

3674 Lindell Boulevard
Saint Louis, MO 63108
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/slu.edu/bonnie_wilson

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