Community Constraints on the Efficacy of Elite Mobilization: The Issuance of Currency Substitutes During the Panic of 1907
American Journal of Sociology 120 (6), 1-46
60 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2015 Last revised: 12 Apr 2016
Date Written: January 6, 2015
Abstract
Organizing collective action to secure support from local communities provides a source of power for elites to protect their interests, but community structures constrain the ability of elites to use this power. I argue that elites are not necessarily a dominant group that shapes the order of a field, but may be just one element in several larger fields. Elites’ power is not static or self-perpetuating but changing and dynamic. There are situations in which elites are forced into movement-like struggles to mobilize support from their community. The success of elites’ mobilization is affected by cultural and structural factors that shape the collective meaning of supporting elites’ actions and the identities that are formed in doing so. I find broad support for these propositions in a study of the issuances of small denomination currency substitutes in 145 U.S. cities during the Panic of 1907. Small denomination currency substitutes were more likely to be issued in places where elite cohesion was high, economic inequality was low, religious homogeneity was high, and more neighboring communities had adopted currency substitutes. I discuss the contributions of this paper to elite studies, the social movement literature, and the sociology of money.
Keywords: Financial Crisis, Elite, Bankers, Collective Action, Private Money, Panic of 1907
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