Defining the Eighth Amendment Concept of Dignity in Conditions of Confinement

Posted: 24 Jun 2015

See all articles by George Bach

George Bach

University of New Mexico - School of Law

Date Written: June 12, 2015

Abstract

In my article, Defining “Sufficiently Serious” in Claims of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 61 Drake L. Rev. 1 (Fall 2013), I articulated and supported several factors that federal courts should use in deciding whether a prisoner’s claim is “sufficiently serious” to give rise to a conditions of confinement claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment: severity, duration, and the effect on personal dignity. In the seminal case of Hope v. Pelzer, the Supreme Court emphasized that the “basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.” My current work in progress, “Defining the Eighth Amendment Concept of Dignity in Conditions of Confinement,” further explores the meaning of “dignity” in the context of prisons and jails, both in the United States and internationally.

I will address the origin of the concept of “dignity” as a factor in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, starting with Hope v. Pelzer and working backwards to include a study of the Framers’ original understanding. The article will also review differing state approaches and look at federal and state jury verdicts in cases brought by prisoners alleging cruel and unusual punishment arising from conditions of confinement. I aim to clarify the notion of “dignity” in a way that will assist practitioners and courts in Eighth Amendment cases.

Suggested Citation

Bach, George, Defining the Eighth Amendment Concept of Dignity in Conditions of Confinement (June 12, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2617766

George Bach (Contact Author)

University of New Mexico - School of Law ( email )

1117 Stanford, N.E.
Albuquerque, NM 87131
United States

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