Elections and Divisiveness: Theory and Evidence

64 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2015 Last revised: 15 Jul 2023

See all articles by Elliott Ash

Elliott Ash

ETH Zürich

Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University

Richard Van Weelden

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2015

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effort allocation choices of incumbent politicians when voters are uncertain about politician preferences. There is a pervasive incentive to "posture" by over-providing effort to pursue divisive policies, even if all voters would strictly prefer to have a consensus policy implemented. As such, the desire of politicians to convince voters that their preferences are aligned with the majority of the electorate can lead them to choose strictly pareto dominated effort allocations. Transparency over the politicians' effort choices can re-enforce the distortions, and for some parameters can be bad both for incentivizing politicians to focus on socially efficient tasks and for allowing voters to select congruent politicians. We take our theoretical results to the data with an empirical analysis of how Members of the U.S. Congress allocate time across issues in their floor speeches. Consistent with the theory, we find evidence of political posturing due to elections among U.S. Senators. We also demonstrate empirically that, among U.S. House Members, increased transparency can lead to more divisive speech.

Suggested Citation

Ash, Elliott and Morelli, Massimo and Van Weelden, Richard, Elections and Divisiveness: Theory and Evidence (July 2015). NBER Working Paper No. w21422, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2638973

Elliott Ash (Contact Author)

ETH Zürich ( email )

Rämistrasse 101
ZUE F7
Zürich, 8092
Switzerland

Massimo Morelli

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Richard Van Weelden

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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