Introduction to: Jet Symposium Issue on 'Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design'
42 Pages Posted: 6 Aug 2015
Date Written: August 4, 2015
Abstract
The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on “Dynamic Contract and Mechanism Design” of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism design literature. We then introduce the papers that are contained in the Symposium issue and finally conclude by discussing avenues for future research. Several of the papers contained in the Symposium issue were presented at the Economic Theory Workshop of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University in June 2013.
Keywords: Dynamic mechanism design, Dynamic contracts
JEL Classification: D44, D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bergemann, Dirk and Pavan, Alessandro, Introduction to: Jet Symposium Issue on 'Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design' (August 4, 2015). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2639691 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2639691
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