The Political Economy of International Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Model

42 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2001

See all articles by Jean-Marie Grether

Jean-Marie Grether

University of Neuchatel - Institute for Economic and Regional Research (IRER)

Jaime de Melo

University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank

Tobias Müller

University of Geneva - Geneva School of Economics and Management

Date Written: February 2001

Abstract

Determinants of national policies towards immigration are analysed in the context of an economy open to international trade. Arguments for the existence of an "immigration surplus" are reviewed and followed by an interpretative survey of the principal contributions of the political economy literature, emphasising the role of the determinants of individual preferences in a direct democracy framework. A median voter model is grafted on several variants of a specific-factor open-economy model to discuss several recent changes in attitudes towards immigration (a stiffened stance, especially towards the unskilled) and in national policies ("melting-pot" vs. guest-worker programs, coexistence of legal and illegal immigrants, lax enforcement towards illegals).

Keywords: Direct democracy, international migration

JEL Classification: D72, F22, J61

Suggested Citation

Grether, Jean-Marie and de Melo, Jaime and Müller, Tobias, The Political Economy of International Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Model (February 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=264374

Jean-Marie Grether (Contact Author)

University of Neuchatel - Institute for Economic and Regional Research (IRER) ( email )

Pierre-a-Mazel 7
Neuchatel, CH-2000
Switzerland
+41 32 718 13 56 (Phone)
+41 32 718 14 01 (Fax)

Jaime De Melo

University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics ( email )

40, boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Geneva 4, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41 22 705 8273 (Phone)
+41 22 705 8293 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.unige.ch/ses/ecopo/demelo/Jaime.html

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Tobias Müller

University of Geneva - Geneva School of Economics and Management ( email )

40, boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Geneva 4, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41 22 379 8238 (Phone)

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