Fighting Crime with a Little Help from My Friends: Political Alignment, Inter-Jurisdictional Cooperation and Crime in Mexico

43 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2015

See all articles by Ruben Durante

Ruben Durante

National University Singapore; Barcelona School of Economics; IZA; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Emilio Gutierrez

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

Date Written: August 2015

Abstract

We investigate the relationship between inter-jurisdictional cooperation and law enforcement in Mexico. Exploiting a Regression Discontinuity Design in close municipal elections, we study how improved opportunities for cooperation in crime prevention among neighboring municipalities - proxied by the degree of political alignment between mayors - may result in lower rates of violent crime. We find that municipalities in which the party in power in the majority of neighboring jurisdictions barely won experience significantly lower homicide rates during the mayor's mandate than those in which it barely lost. This effect is sizeable and robust, is increasing in the share of neighboring municipalities governed by the same party, is independent of which party governs the neighboring municipalities, and does not appear to be driven by improved cooperation with either federal or state authorities.

Keywords: crime, inter-jurisdictional cooperation, law enforcement, Mexico, political parties

JEL Classification: H11, H41, H7

Suggested Citation

Durante, Ruben and Gutierrez, Emilio, Fighting Crime with a Little Help from My Friends: Political Alignment, Inter-Jurisdictional Cooperation and Crime in Mexico (August 2015). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10769, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2645722

Ruben Durante (Contact Author)

National University Singapore ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://www.rubendurante.net

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

Carrer de Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

IZA ( email )

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Emilio Gutierrez

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) ( email )

Av. Camino a Sta. Teresa 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Mexico City, CDMX 10700
Mexico

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