Attending to Moral Values

Chapter 5, Moral Judgment and Decision Making: The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol 50, 169-190, Elsevier, 2009

25 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2015 Last revised: 16 Sep 2015

See all articles by Rumen Iliev

Rumen Iliev

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor

Sonya Sachdeva

Northwestern University

Daniel M. Bartels

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Craig Joseph

Independent

Satoru Suzuki

Independent

Douglas L. Medin

Northwestern University - Department of Psychology

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

There has been an upsurge of interest in moral decision making, which appears to have some distinctive properties. For example, some moral decisions are so strongly influenced by ideas about how sacred entities are to be treated, that they seem to be relatively insensitive to the costs and benefits entailed (e.g., "do not allow companies to pollute the earth for a fee, even if pollution credits reduce pollution"). One interpretation of such decisions is that sacred values motivate rigid decision processes that ignore outcomes. This, however, seems paradoxical in that those who are most offended by acts of pollution, for example, likely care more about pollution than others do. Our analysis of the literature on moral decision making (including our own studies) suggests a framework based on a "flexible view," where both actions and outcomes are important, and where attentional processes are intimately involved in how the decision maker conceptualizes the problem, how actions and outcomes are weighted, and how protected values are translated into judgments. We argue that understanding the cognitive processes underlying morally motivated decision making offers one method for solving the puzzle of why such deeply entrenched commitments (the rigid view) vary widely in their expression across contexts (the flexible view).

Suggested Citation

Iliev, Rumen and Sachdeva, Sonya and Bartels, Daniel M. and Joseph, Craig and Suzuki, Satoru and Medin, Douglas L., Attending to Moral Values (2009). Chapter 5, Moral Judgment and Decision Making: The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol 50, 169-190, Elsevier, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2649198

Rumen Iliev

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor ( email )

500 S. State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States

Sonya Sachdeva

Northwestern University ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Daniel M. Bartels (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Craig Joseph

Independent ( email )

Satoru Suzuki

Independent ( email )

Douglas L. Medin

Northwestern University - Department of Psychology ( email )

Evanston, IL
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
47
Abstract Views
715
PlumX Metrics