Performance Measurement and Incentive Intensity

36 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2015

See all articles by José Alberto Bayo Moriones

José Alberto Bayo Moriones

Public University of Navarre - Department of Business Administration

Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez

Universidad Publica de Navarra ; IZA

Sara Martinez-de-Morentin

Universidad Pública de Navarra

Abstract

This study addresses the factors that determine the intensity of pay for performance schemes. The results indicate that the use of individual and group incentives boost intensity, whereas plant or firm pay for performance do not seem to affect the variable of interest. In addition, the adoption of measures of results, such as productivity or quality, has a significant positive effect on intensity. On the contrary, measures of human resource management outcomes, subjective measures and financial measures are not significant or have a negative effect on the intensity of pay for performance.

Keywords: pay for performance

JEL Classification: J30, M52, M12

Suggested Citation

Bayo Moriones, José Alberto and Galdon-Sanchez, Jose E. and Martinez-de-Morentin, Sara, Performance Measurement and Incentive Intensity. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9243, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2655284 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2655284

José Alberto Bayo Moriones (Contact Author)

Public University of Navarre - Department of Business Administration ( email )

Campus de Arrosadia
31006 Pamplona
Spain
34 948 169 377 (Phone)
34 948 169 404 (Fax)

Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez

Universidad Publica de Navarra ( email )

Department of Economics
Campus de Arrosadia
Pamplona, Navarra 31006
Spain
+34 948 16 9338 (Phone)
+34 948 16 97 21 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.unavarra.es/~galdon/

IZA

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/personnel/photos/index_html?key=1494

Sara Martinez-de-Morentin

Universidad Pública de Navarra ( email )

Campus de Arrosadía
Pamplona, Navarra 31006
Spain

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