Greed or Grievance, a Contextual Reconciliation?
31 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2015
Date Written: September 11, 2015
Abstract
We use a simple coordination game to suggest that rebels are more likely to use grievance to coordinate rebellion against strong states. The actual feasibility of conflict then matters more in weaker states. We use Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner’s (2009) data in the context of state power to indirectly test this hypothesis. We find, consistent with our theory, that their “significant” greed or feasibility variables matter more for explaining conflict in weaker states. We therefore suggest that a search for the universal correlates of war may be problematic. Moreover, even if these correlates exist, parametric point estimates of the marginal effect of such correlates of war may be misleading since the size of such an effect may differ contextually. Thus, using such point estimates devoid of context to capture the potential effect of policy levers may lead to erroneous policy.
Keywords: conflict, greed, grievance, coordination, rebellion, revolution
JEL Classification: D74
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation