Unemployment (Fears) and Deflationary Spirals

72 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2015

See all articles by Wouter J. den Haan

Wouter J. den Haan

University of Amsterdam; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Tinbergen Institute

Pontus Rendahl

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics

Markus Riegler

University of Bonn

Date Written: September 2015

Abstract

The interaction of incomplete markets and sticky nominal wages is shown to magnify business cycles even though these two features - in isolation - dampen them. During recessions, fears of unemployment stir up precautionary sentiments which induces agents to save more. The additional savings may be used as investments in both a productive asset (equity) and an unproductive asset (money). But even a small rise in money demand has important consequences. The desire to hold money puts deflationary pressure on the economy, which, provided that nominal wages are sticky, increases wage costs and reduces firm profits. Lower profits repress the desire to save in equity, which increases (the fear of) unemployment, and so on. This is a powerful mechanism which causes the model to behave differently from both its complete markets version, and a version with incomplete markets but without aggregate uncertainty. In contrast to previous results in the literature, agents uniformly prefer non-trivial levels of unemployment insurance.

Keywords: business cycles, heterogeneous agents, Keynesian unemployment, magnification, propagation, search friction

JEL Classification: E12, E24, E32, E41, J64, J65

Suggested Citation

Den Haan, Wouter J. and Rendahl, Pontus and Riegler, Markus, Unemployment (Fears) and Deflationary Spirals (September 2015). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10814, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2661543

Wouter J. Den Haan (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www1.feb.uva.nl/toe/content/people/content/denhaan/pers.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Pontus Rendahl

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom

Markus Riegler

University of Bonn ( email )

Regina-Pacis-Weg 3
Postfach 2220
Bonn, D-53012
Germany

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