Equilibrium Relationship between Expected Return and Skewness

15 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2015

See all articles by Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya

Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya

University of Alaska Anchorage

Leyuan You

Texas State University, San Marcos

Date Written: September 21, 2015

Abstract

Traditional finance theories assume that investors are risk averse whereas in reality investors exhibit both risk averse and risk seeking behaviors. For example the same individual could be purchasing insurance (risk averse) and lottery ticket (risk seeking) simultaneously. We propose that the utility function of an economic agent is concave (risk averse) for wealth below his/her current wealth and is convex (risk seeking) for wealth above his/her current wealth. This type of utility function allows the agent to display simultaneous risk averse and risk seeking behavior. We show that for an agent with such a utility function, the mean-skewness space is relevant in understanding his/her behavior. More specifically, we prove that in equilibrium, the efficient frontier in the mean-skewness space is concave and downward sloping. We test our equilibrium relationship empirically with stocks listed on the NYSE from 2002 to 2007 and find that our results support our theory.

Keywords: Utility theory, Asset Pricing, Skewness

JEL Classification: C21, G12

Suggested Citation

Bhattacharyya, Nalinaksha and You, Leyuan, Equilibrium Relationship between Expected Return and Skewness (September 21, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2663711 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2663711

Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya (Contact Author)

University of Alaska Anchorage ( email )

3211 Providence Drive
Anchorage, AK 99508
United States
(907)786 1949 (Phone)
(907) 786 4115 (Fax)

Leyuan You

Texas State University, San Marcos ( email )

601 University Drive
San Marcos, TX 78666-4616
United States
512-245-3215 (Phone)

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