Стимулы и Риски Во Взаимоотношениях Между Принципалом и Агентом (Incentives and Risks in Relationship between the Principal and the Agent)

Financial Risk Management

16 Pages Posted: 20 Oct 2015

See all articles by Vigen Babkenovich Minasyan

Vigen Babkenovich Minasyan

Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (RANEPA) - Research Laboratory of Corporate Strategies

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

In work the problem of the conflict of relationship between the principal and the agent on the basis of basic model of moral risk is investigated. Are considered usefulness which are pursued by participants of this relationship and their risks at different types of their relationship. In work measures of risk of VaR and ES for these participants are entered and formulas for their calculations are removed. The optimum behavior of participants at various forms of their relationship is investigated.

В работе исследуется проблема конфликта взаимоотношений между принципалом и агентом на основе базовой модели морального риска. Рассматриваются полезности, которые преследуются участниками этих взаимоотношений и их риски при различных видах их взаимоотношений. В работе введены меры риска VaR и ES для данных участников и выведены формулы для их расчетов. Исследовано оптимальное поведение участников при различных формах их взаимоотношений.

Keywords: the agency conflict, the principal, the agent, usefulness function, production function stimulating the contract, risks of usefulness, a measure of risk of VaR, a measure of risk of ES.

JEL Classification: C15, G31, G32, G30

Suggested Citation

Minasyan, Vigen Babkenovich, Стимулы и Риски Во Взаимоотношениях Между Принципалом и Агентом (Incentives and Risks in Relationship between the Principal and the Agent) (2015). Financial Risk Management, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2668118 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2668118

Vigen Babkenovich Minasyan (Contact Author)

Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (RANEPA) - Research Laboratory of Corporate Strategies ( email )

Moscow
Russia

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