Equilibrium Analysis of Political Institutions

Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions, Jennifer Gandhi and Rubén Ruiz-Rufino, eds., April 2015

30 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2015

See all articles by Milan Svolik

Milan Svolik

Yale University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: October 2, 2014

Abstract

At their most political, institutions determine who holds power and how power is exercised. Political institutions thus shape the influence and behavior of their participants and, for that very reason, their adoption and design are the subject of political struggle. Formal political theory – the application of game theoretic methods to political phenomena – develops this basic insight. Game-theoretically inspired arguments explain the emergence and persistence of political institutions as the equilibrium outcome of strategic interaction among actors who strive to anticipate the implications of the institutional status quo and its conceivable alternatives for both their own and others’ welfare.

Keywords: political institutions; formal theory; comparative politics

JEL Classification: P16

Suggested Citation

Svolik, Milan, Equilibrium Analysis of Political Institutions (October 2, 2014). Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions, Jennifer Gandhi and Rubén Ruiz-Rufino, eds., April 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2668795

Milan Svolik (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, CT 06520-8269
United States

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