Procedures vs. Incentives: The Case of the University Promotion System in Italy

35 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2015

See all articles by Carlo Dal Maso

Carlo Dal Maso

IMT Institute for Advanced Studies

Enrico Rettore

University of Padua; IRVAPP

Lorenzo Rocco

University of Padua; University of Toulouse I

Abstract

A common observation is that individuals strive to neutralize the effect of procedural rules designed to drive choices away from their private optimum. An example of this phenomenon is offered by the reaction of Italian academia to two reforms that modified the procedures of recruitment and promotion, by introducing random selection of the examiners not appointed by the recruiting school and reducing from two to one the number of candidates to be qualified. We model the negotiation occurring within evaluation committees and test the decision rule implied by the theoretical model on the sample composed of all selections to associate and full professorship initiated by the Italian schools of economics between 2004 and 2011. Particularly, we investigate whether these reforms decreased the relative weight of the examiner appointed by the recruiting school on committee's decision. Empirical results suggest that both reforms had little if no effect on examiners' weights.

Keywords: university recruitment, incentives, negotiation, formal procedures

JEL Classification: D71, M51, I2

Suggested Citation

Dal Maso, Carlo and Rettore, Enrico and Rocco, Lorenzo, Procedures vs. Incentives: The Case of the University Promotion System in Italy. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9386, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2672172 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2672172

Carlo Dal Maso (Contact Author)

IMT Institute for Advanced Studies ( email )

Complesso San Micheletto
Lucca, 55100
Italy

Enrico Rettore

University of Padua ( email )

Via Verdi 26
Trento, 28122
Italy
+39 0461 281316 (Phone)

IRVAPP ( email )

Via Santa Croce 77
Trento, I-38122
Italy

Lorenzo Rocco

University of Padua ( email )

Via 8 Febbraio, 2
Padova, Vicenza 35122
Italy

University of Toulouse I

Place Anatole France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

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