The Management of Natural Resources Under Asymmetry of Information

Posted: 12 Oct 2015

See all articles by Gérard Gaudet

Gérard Gaudet

University of Montreal - Department of Economics; Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (CIREQ)

Pierre Lasserre

University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Economics; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO); University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)

Date Written: October 2015

Abstract

We provide an introductory review to the application of the theory of incentives under asymmetry of information to the exploitation and management of natural resources. We concentrate mostly on principal-agent problems with adverse selection as posed by the regulation of nonrenewable resources, stressing the fact that the inherently dynamic nature of natural resource exploitation creates situations and results not found in other contexts. We also point out private information issues that may arise involving renewable as opposed to nonrenewable resources, strategic interactions with signaling between decision makers in resource exploitation games, and the design of environmental policy in which principal-agent problems subject to moral hazard may occur.

Suggested Citation

Gaudet, Gérard and Lasserre, Pierre, The Management of Natural Resources Under Asymmetry of Information (October 2015). Annual Review of Resource Economics, Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 291-308, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2672266 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-100814-124959

Gérard Gaudet (Contact Author)

University of Montreal - Department of Economics ( email )

C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-Ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://sceco.umontreal.ca/repertoire-departement/vue/gaudet-gerard-1/

Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (CIREQ) ( email )

C.P. 6128, Succursale Centre-ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.cireqmontreal.com

Pierre Lasserre

University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Economics

Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

University of Angers - Research Group in Quantitative Saving (GREQAM)

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