Spinoza, Feminism and Privacy: Exploring an Immanent Ethics of Privacy

17 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2015

See all articles by Janice Richardson

Janice Richardson

Monash University - Faculty of Law

Date Written: October 1, 2014

Abstract

In this article I explore the usefulness of Spinoza’s ethics for feminism by considering ways in which it allows feminists to rethink privacy. I draw upon some of Spinoza’s central ideas to address the following question: when should information be classed as private and when should it be communicated? This is a question that is considered by the common law courts. Attempts to find a moral underpinning for such a tortious action against invasions of privacy have tended to draw upon Kant’s categorical imperative. In contrast, I want to consider how Spinoza provides an immanent ethics that reconfigures how privacy is understood.

Keywords: Spinoza, Feminist theory, Privacy, Adequate knowledge, Philosophy of information, Immanent ethics

Suggested Citation

Richardson, Janice, Spinoza, Feminism and Privacy: Exploring an Immanent Ethics of Privacy (October 1, 2014). Feminist Legal Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2677489

Janice Richardson (Contact Author)

Monash University - Faculty of Law ( email )

Wellington Road
Clayton, Victoria 3800
Australia

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