Strategic Delegation: An Experiment

Posted: 14 May 2001

See all articles by Chaim Fershtman

Chaim Fershtman

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Uri Gneezy

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Abstract

We examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. Specifically, we show that when the proposer uses a delegate, his share increases. Since in such a case the proposer does not use the delegate as a commitment device, this effect identifies an additional explanation of the delegation phenomenon. This result holds when delegation is mandatory or optional. We also show that unobserved delegation by the responder reduces his share as his delegate is perceived to be more willing to accept tough offers.

Suggested Citation

Fershtman, Chaim and Gneezy, Uri, Strategic Delegation: An Experiment. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=268005

Chaim Fershtman (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 7167 (Phone)
+972 3 640 9908 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Uri Gneezy

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

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