Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism

24 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2015

See all articles by Seana Shiffrin

Seana Shiffrin

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: 1999

Abstract

Increasingly, claims of morality's overridingness are met with resistance, especially from theorists who regard moral reasons as, in an important sense, subjective. This paper challenges this resistance by arguing that moral overridingness may be reconciled with this significant form of subjectivism about moral reasons. It does not argue for or even endorse this form of subjectivism. In fact, I suspect the view is false. Nevertheless, because of subjectivism's persistent pull, it is worth exploring the view's ramifications and, in particular, the degree to which -- through its challenge to overridingness -- it would be deflationary of morality's authority. Moreover, such an exploration will show that a critical source of overridingness may be found in features of morality that are intrinsic to its structure.

Suggested Citation

Shiffrin, Seana, Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism (1999). 109 Ethics 772-94 (1999), UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 15-44, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2685416

Seana Shiffrin (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States

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