Crowdfunding Delusions

36 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2015

See all articles by Reza Dibadj

Reza Dibadj

University of San Francisco - School of Law

Date Written: November 5, 2015

Abstract

Beyond all the hype surrounding crowdfunding there is a curious incongruity. On the one hand, there exist apparently successful crowdfunding sites, ; while on the other hand, more than three years after the Jumpstart Our Business Act (“JOBS Act”) mandated an equity crowdfunding exception, we are still waiting for final regulations from the SEC.

This essay explores this irony, arguing that existing crowdfunding sites carefully manage around a fundamental ambiguity in the securities laws — a surprisingly fuzzy definition of what a “security” is. It then shifts to understanding the existing regulatory framework: the federal crowdfunding statute and proposed rules, as well as other existing alternatives issuers might consider. Second, this essay surveys other potential alternatives to place crowd-sourced securities and even new state crowdfunding exemptions — but ultimately argues that none are attractive. As such, it is far more likely that crowdfunding sites will continue to operate as they currently do, rather than subject themselves to any new crowdfunding rules or seek alternative exemptions. Finally, it argues that, for all of its advantages, crowdfunding presents fundamental negatives that cannot be regulated away. As such, we must face a stark choice: either prophylactically ban the activity, or allow it with few restrictions. To think that we can craft a balanced regulatory framework for crowdfunding is delusional.

Suggested Citation

Dibadj, Reza, Crowdfunding Delusions (November 5, 2015). Hastings Business Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2686460

Reza Dibadj (Contact Author)

University of San Francisco - School of Law ( email )

2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
United States
415-422-5253 (Phone)

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