A Theory of Central Bank Accountability
22 Pages Posted: 4 May 2001
There are 2 versions of this paper
A Theory of Central Bank Accountability
A Theory of Central Bank Accountability
Date Written: January 2000
Abstract
In this paper we investigate central bank accountability by looking at the effect of transparency in a simple monetary policy game with an overriding mechanism. Monetary policy is transparent if there is little uncertainty about the central banker's preferences for inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization. Transparency enhances the central bank's accountability. The paper shows that transparency leads to a lower expected rate of inflation and less stabilization of supply shocks.
Keywords: Accountability, central banks, monetary policy, transparency
JEL Classification: E52, E58
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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