Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World

Review of Financial Studies, July 2015 Volume 28 Issue 8

University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2015-501

60 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2015

See all articles by Peter Iliev

Peter Iliev

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance

Karl V. Lins

University of Utah - Department of Finance

Darius P. Miller

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department

Lukas Roth

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 9, 2015

Abstract

Using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 43 countries, we investigate whether laws and regulations as well as votes cast by U.S. institutional investors are consistent with an effective shareholder voting process. We find that laws and regulations allow for meaningful votes to be cast as shareholder voting is both mandatory and binding for important elections. For votes cast, we find there is greater dissent voting when investors fear expropriation. Further, greater dissent voting is associated with higher director turnover and more M&A withdrawals. Our results suggest that shareholder voting is an effective mechanism for exercising governance around the world.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Voting, Insider Control, Shareholder Protection, Institutional Investors

JEL Classification: D7, F30, G15, G32, G34, K22

Suggested Citation

Iliev, Peter and Lins, Karl V. and Miller, Darius P. and Roth, Lukas, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World (January 9, 2015). Review of Financial Studies, July 2015 Volume 28 Issue 8, University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2015-501, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2692116

Peter Iliev

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance ( email )

348 Business Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States

Karl V. Lins

University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )

David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801-585-3171 (Phone)
801-581-7214 (Fax)

Darius P. Miller

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department ( email )

United States

Lukas Roth (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )

2-32E Business Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-4431 (Phone)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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