Loyalty, Peer Group Effects, and 401(K)

Posted: 22 Nov 2015

Date Written: January 6, 2006

Abstract

In this paper we analyze investors’ behavior in the presence of social interactions. Two main models are explored: one based on peer group effects and the other on loyalty. The motivation for this study is the observed behavior of employees when choosing asset allocation for their 401(k) funds. Employees are typically overinvested in own company stock, while theory predicts a strong diversification motive.We argue that the proposed models justify this behavior, even in an environment with full rationality.We also contrast the implications of each model concerning other risky assets.

Keywords: Social interactions; Loyalty; Peer group effects; 401(k); Short-selling 1 Introduction

JEL Classification: D14; D82; G11

Suggested Citation

Pinheiro, Marcelo, Loyalty, Peer Group Effects, and 401(K) (January 6, 2006). Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 48, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693813

Marcelo Pinheiro (Contact Author)

PCAOB ( email )

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